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ABSTRACT: The maritime transportation system is increasingly a target of cyber attacks. This paper describes a
taxonomy that supports the creation of adversarial cyber models, risk mitigation, and resiliency plans as
applied to the maritime industry, using the Automatic Identification System as a specific illustration of the
approach. This method has already been applied to the aviation sector; retooling it for a maritime example
demonstrates its broad applicability to the transportation sector, in general.

1 INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities, exploits, and threats are
on the rise across all critical infrastructure sectors,
particularly transportation. In previous work, the
authors proposed a graph‐based, communications‐
oriented framework and taxonomy with which to
create adversarial models, risk mitigation, and
resiliency plans for the aviation sector (Haass,
Craiger, & Kessler, 2018). We propose to apply this
framework and taxonomy to maritime systems in
order to demonstrate the general applicability of the
methodology.
There are many analogues between the aviation
and maritime transportation sectors; whereas aviation
has airport operations, air traffic control, airline
operations, aircraft operations, and unmanned aircraft
systems, maritime has port operations, vessel traffic
services (VTS), shipping line operations, vessel
operations, and unmanned maritime systems,
respectively. Both sectors have manufacturing, cargo
and passenger transport, and handoffs of passengers
and cargo to other modes of transportation. Both have
a broad variety of users, including commercial,

military, individual, corporate, and public sector craft.
And both are subject to attack by a variety of cyber
actors, ranging from criminals and hacktivists, to
spies, terrorists, and information warriors. Indeed,
there are similarities to other transportation sectors
(e.g., trucking and railroads), as well as other critical
infrastructure sectors.
Numerous maritime‐specific communications
systems are used for navigation, ship‐to‐ship and
ship‐to‐shore
information
exchange,
vessel
management and control, cargo scheduling and
management, passenger entertainment, and safety.
Most of these systems were created without
cybersecurity in mind and well before the widespread
cyberattacks that are now so common on the Internet.
From maritime automated navigation systems and the
Automatic Identification System (AIS) to Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and the Long‐
Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) network, it
is clear that it is important to design, deploy, and
maintain critical maritime systems with appropriate
adversarial models, risk frameworks, and resiliency
plans (Kessler, 2019).
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Using a general system‐of‐systems approach
outlined in a review paper by Haass, Sampigethaya,
and Capezzuto (2016) and an aviation‐specific
application of the approach described by Haass et al.
(2018), this paper provides a framework for
addressing maritime cybersecurity challenges in a
systematic fashion, rather than on an isolated and ad
hoc system‐by‐system or protocol‐by‐protocol basis
(Mansouri, Gorod, Wakeman, & Sauser, 2009). Where
possible, a system will be isolated and reflected in the
decision tree taxonomy. Dependencies and shared
assumptions can be expressed with a language useful
for the many constituents within the maritime
environment. Through the application of this
framework, many cybersecurity issues can be
addressed, including communication challenges that
will be particularly important as unmanned and
autonomous systems are incorporated into the shared
maritime space (MarEx, 2018; Ridden, 2018).

2 THE MARITIME SYSTEM
The importance of the maritime transportation system
(MTS) to the global and national economy cannot be
over‐stated. Globally, roughly 94,000 ships, with an
asset value of nearly $1.5 trillion, transport more than
$19 trillion of cargo each year, with an annual trade
value increase of about 3% (Barki & Délèze‐Black,
2017).
In the U.S. alone, 53% of imports and 38% of
exports are by ship, and maritime represents the
largest import/export transportation modality.
Furthermore, the U.S. has been the largest importer
and second largest exporter of containerized cargo for
most of the last decade (World Shipping Council,
n.d.). Maritime cargo contributes at least $649 billion
annually to the U.S. gross domestic product and
supports more than 13 million jobs. The U.S. MTS also
includes 25,000 miles of navigable channels, more
than 360 ports, at least 3700 marine terminals, and
more than 12 million recreational boats (DOT, n.d.).

actually a system of systems. Each system can be
described as a set of components and the
communication pathways between those components.
Of course, one system can also be seen as having
dependencies upon other systems as all of the systems
intercommunicate (Figure 1).
There are many communications systems used
within the MTS including all of the data networking
at ports, on board ships, within a shipping line,
between supply chain partners, and more.
Communications within and between systems are
dependent upon protocols whose behavior will be
dictated by the specific system. Vulnerability analysis
requires recognition of the uniqueness of each system
and application, and needs to include the examination
of all types of disruption ranging from weather to
hostile actions; this is known as the all‐hazards
approach. This categorization distinguishes between
vulnerabilities that impact only cyber systems (e.g.,
data, information, and communication) from those
that include cyber‐physical threats (e.g., control,
navigation, or other systems) (Roberts, 2015;
Serpanos, 2018). Indeed, this categorization also
allows us to distinguish between vulnerabilities that
we can control or mitigate (e.g., attacks by people)
and those that we cannot control (e.g., nature,
weather, stochastic failure).
An individual ship is itself a complex cyber‐
physical network node with a large variety of
communication systems for crew, passengers,
external sources, and internal operations, including:
 Bridge Navigation Systems (e.g., GPS, Electronic
Chart Display and Information System [ECDIS],
AIS, LRIT)
 External Communication Systems (e.g., satellite
communications, FleetBroadband, Internet)
 Mechanical Systems (e.g., main engine, auxiliary
engine, steering control, ballast management)
 Ship Monitoring and Security Systems (e.g.,
closed‐circuit television, Ship Security Alert
System [SSAS], access control systems, sensors)
 Cargo Handling Systems (e.g., valve remote
control
systems,
level/pressure
monitoring
systems)
 Other specialized networks (e.g., Combat
Command & Control Systems on warships,
Entertainment
Systems
and
Point‐Of‐Sale
terminals
on
passenger
vessels;
Vessel
Management Systems on commercial fishing
vessels)
Ship electronics, sensors, and actuators are all
integrated within the communication systems listed
above. Internet‐of‐Things (IoT) devices will become
increasingly ubiquitous as smart ships and smart
ports evolve. The huge amount of information
gathered by Vessel Data Recorders (VDR)
demonstrate the complexity and number of critical
components that a cybersecurity taxonomy must
address when considering event logging or
cybersecurity incidents.

Figure 1. Components and communication pathways within
the AIS system, and dependencies upon the Global
Navigation Satellite System and Radio Frequency(RF)
Network.

The global maritime system ‐‐ including all
civilian, commercial, and military ship traffic ‐‐ is
430

The proposed framework supports the assignment
of types of vulnerabilities, attacks, and exploits with
their potential disruptive effects, ranging from critical
(e.g., vessel stability and safety) to minor (e.g.,
reduction in entertainment or service quality). Cyber
components include the core software, computing,

and network infrastructure of the ship itself, together
with additional shipping line‐specific software
systems. Additionally, GPS, ECDIS, AIS, and other
systems include real‐time updates while underway,
and can include different nodes as the vessel crosses
global boundaries.
An adversary can be thought of as another part ‐‐
albeit a malicious one ‐‐ of the system of systems. An
actor is malicious if they attempt to modify, subvert, or
in any other way cause the cyber or cyber‐physical
system to behave beyond the limits of its intended
operation. For purposes of the remainder of this
paper, we will explore AIS in some detail as an
example of the application of this analysis.

carry more than 150 passengers; warships are
exempted from AIS requirements although all
modern warships carry AIS (USCG, 2018).
A key component of AIS is the use of precise
positioning technology. AIS does not specify ‐‐ nor
does it depend upon ‐‐ which GNSS is employed; AIS
merely broadcasts a position using a feed from the
shipʹs navigation and positioning system. That said,
any cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the vesselʹs GNSS
will affect the precision of the AIS transmissions
regarding location. GNSS vulnerabilities, particularly
those related to GPS, are integral to AIS
vulnerabilities but will not be specifically addressed
in this paper (except as they affect AIS) (Czaplewski
& Goward, 2016).

3 AIS BACKGROUND
The Automatic Identification System is a tracking
system that allows a vessel to view local marine traffic
(i.e., within 10‐20 nautical miles) and to be seen by
other nearby ships or AIS equipment installations.
AIS was originally designed so that a ship fitted with
an appropriate chartplotter could view the local traffic
and quickly determine any given shipʹs name, unique
International
Maritime
Organization
(IMO)
registration number, size (i.e., length, beam, draft, and
gross tonnage), position (latitude and longitude),
course, bearing, destination, status (e.g., anchored,
docked, underway under power, etc.), and other
information (Figure 2). More recently, many Web sites
collect and aggregate AIS information and have
created a database so that anyone can look up
information about any AIS‐equipped vessel in near‐
real‐time (Figure 3).

Figure 2. Chartplotter display including AIS data, showing
ships in the local area (from
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/images/WhatYouSeeWithAIS.jpg).

AIS was introduced in the 2002 International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
Chapter V of the SOLAS agreement, titled ʺSafety of
Navigation,ʺ mandates that ships of a certain size
and/or function carry AIS transceivers as an
additional safety measure (IMO, 2002). Ships in U.S.
waters generally fall under U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
regulations; 33 CFR 164.46 defines AIS requirements,
which include all vessels of 1600 or more gross tons,
commercial power vessels 65 or more feet (19.8
meters) in length, and a power vessel certified to

Figure 3. AIS information from a Web aggregator (screen
shot from http://www.findship.co).

AIS communications protocols are described in
International
Telecommunication
Union
Radiocommunication
sector
(ITU‐R)
Recommendations M.585‐7 and M.1371‐5 (ITU, 2014,
2015). AIS employs a shared radio‐communication
channel using a form of time‐division multiple access
(TDMA). Time on the radio channel is divided into
2,250 slots per minute so that each slot has a duration
of 26.67 milliseconds. The protocol defines how AIS
stations stay in synchronization so that they do not
overlap their transmissions and advertise when they
will be transmitting next. New AIS stations, such as
those on a ship coming within radio range close to
other ships, can also be added to the lineup of
transmitters on the channel (Wikipedia, 2018).
SOLAS‐compliant Class A AIS transponders
employ a Self‐Organizing TDMA (SOTDMA)
broadcast mode, transmitting information every 2 to
10 seconds while underway1 and every three minutes
while at anchor; these transponders can also transmit
and receive safety‐related text messages. Less
expensive Class B AIS transponders employ a Carrier‐
Sense
TDMA
(CSTDMA)
broadcast
mode,
transmitting dynamic information (e.g., position,
course, and speed) every 30‐180 seconds, static data
(e.g., vessel name and IMO number) every six
The rate of transmission is dependent upon the
shipʹs speed and whether they are changing course or
not; faster and/or maneuvering vessels transmit more
frequently than slower vessels that are on a steady
course.
1
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minutes, and, optionally, safety‐related text messages
(Shine Micro, n.d.; Wikipedia, 2018).
AIS messages are formatted according to the
National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA)
0183 serial communications protocol standard and are
referred to as sentences. The two common AIS
sentences are !AIVDM (data received from other
vessels)
and
!AIVDO
(vesselʹs
transmitted
information). There are just over two dozen AIS
message types. At a data rate of 9600 bits/sec,
messages are limited to 256 bits of information per
time slot. AIS employs maritime very high frequency
(VHF) channels 87B (161.975 MHz) and 88B (162.025
MHz) (Raymond, 2016; Wikipedia, 2018.

4 SECURITY CONCERNS
AIS improves vessel traffic management and safety
through increased situational awareness. AIS
messages, however, are transmitted in plaintext,
which introduces a potential security risk since these
unencrypted AIS messages can be read by anyone
with a receiver. Add to this the Web sites with
instructions for building AIS receivers using
inexpensive hardware 2 and open source software 3 ,
and it is clear that AIS is vulnerable to a variety of
exploits.
Attacks on AIS, and information in general, can
affect the information’s confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (the so‐called CIA Triad) as well as three
other characteristics, namely, possession, authenticity,
and utility; these six together are sometimes called the
Parkerian Hexad (Parker, 2015):
 Confidentiality refers to protecting information
from unauthorized access or disclosure.
 Integrity refers to the state of information being
free from inadvertent or deliberate manipulation.
 Availability refers to the usersʹ ability to access
information when needed.
 Possession (or control) refers to the loss of data by
the authorized user (even if the ʺthiefʺ cannot
access the data).
 Authenticity (aka authentication) refers to being able
to prove the identity of the sender of information.
 Utility refers to the usefulness of the data to the
user (e.g., possessing encrypted data without a
decryption key or receiving a message to do
something after the date when the action is
required are examples of low utility)
Plaintext messages have long been a security
vulnerability in the storage of data on computers and
transmission of data on networks. Various types of
protections have been implemented in order to
protect information and information systems from
attacks on all elements of the Parkerian hexad.
Cryptography plays a particularly key role in
protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and
authenticity of information. In its most simple form,
the process of creating encrypted ciphertext requires
the original unencrypted plaintext message, an
E.g., https://www.partmarine.com/blog/wireless_
ais_howto
3 E.g., https://opencpn.org
2
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encryption algorithm, and a key (or, sometimes, two
keys). Secret key cryptographic protocols protect data
confidentiality because ciphertext is unreadable as
long as the key required to decrypt the message
remains secret. One‐way cryptographic hashes are
used to verify the integrity of a message, using a
mathematical algorithm that provides a digital
fingerprint of the message; changing even one bit in a
message will cause the hash value to change,
indicating that the content of the message has
changed. Message authentication codes (MAC) use a
shared secret key and can be used to verify the
integrity of a message, as well as providing
authentication, verifying the identity of the message
sender. Authentication can also be provided using
public key cryptographic methods (Kessler, 2018).
The AIS protocols provide no internal mechanism
for message integrity and encryption. While some AIS
products have the ability to transmit and receive
using an encryption mode, the methods are
proprietary and are designed to allow a ʺfleetʺ of
ships to see each other but not be seen outside of the
encrypted group. Indeed, the U.S. Coast Guard has
described Encrypted AIS (EAIS) for military and law
enforcement
purposes,
although
products
implementing that specification are not generally
available to civilian classes of vessels (USCG, 2014).
AIS was designed to assist vessels in situational
awareness by providing them knowledge of maritime
traffic beyond their ability to visualize it and beyond
the capability of traditional radar. By the nature of
AIS broadcasts, then, a lot of information can be
received by anyone who just wants to know what is
going on in their proximity, which might include
individuals with nefarious intent such as pirates,
terrorists, or other criminal actors. But this level of
information leakage is nothing compared to aggregation
sites that broadcast on the Web the location of
thousands of ships around the globe, such as
FindShip, MarineTraffic, VesselFinder, Vesseltracker,
and many more. The IMO Maritime Safety Committee
warned about the dangers of this information leakage
as far back as 2004, noting that ʺthe publication on the
world‐wide web... of AIS data transmitted by ships
could be detrimental to the safety and security of
ships and port facilities and was undermining the
efforts of the Organization and its Member States to
enhance the safety of navigation and security in the
international maritime transport sectorʺ (IMO, 2018,
para. 1).

5 THREAT ASSESSMENTS
There are a variety of approaches to examining the
security threat landscape in any system. We will
examine several here and apply them to AIS. Figure 4
provides a graphical overview of AIS components,
communication pathways, and threat vectors. In this
description, each component ‐‐ including bad actors ‐‐
is shown along with communication links composed
of valid messages, software‐based threats, and radio
frequency‐based threats. This is a similar approach
taken by graph theory, by identifying the
communicating elements and the communication

links (Boukhtouta, Mouheb, Debbabi, Alfandi, Iqbal,
& El Barachi, 2015).

Figure 4. AIS components, communication pathways, and
attack vectors (modified from Balduzzi, Wilhoit, & Pasta,
2014)

As mentioned earlier in the paper, there are
lessons that the various transportation sectors can
learn from each other in terms of cybersecurity. A
great deal of work has gone into studying security
vulnerabilities of Automatic Dependent Surveillance‐
Broadcast (ADS‐B), a system for providing aircraft in
flight with the same situational awareness as AIS
provides ships at sea. It has been instructive to see
how some of the ADS‐B security literature applies to
the maritime domain.
Based upon a threat assessment model for ADS‐B
described by Gauthier and Seker (2018), we can
identify three primary types of intentional, human‐
initiated cyberattacks on AIS:
 Disruption of GPS4 signals
 Jamming of the wireless communications
 Manipulation of AIS transmissions
This perspective is very much in line with the
system of systems approach; each of the three main
categories actually represents a different system that
must be secured in order to secure AIS; namely, GNSS
or other positioning systems, radiocommunication
propagation paths, and AIS transceivers. We can
further subdivide the AIS category above into:
 Message injection (spoofing)
 Message deletion (denial‐of‐ service)
 Message modification (alteration of message
contents (data diddling)
Strohmeier et al. (2015) identified five primary
threat categories to ADS‐B that can also apply to AIS;
the first is a passive attack and the remaining are
active attacks:
 Eavesdropping is a simple, passive attack that can
be easily accomplished since AIS is, by definition,
a broadcast radio system. Furthermore, messages
are generally transmitted in an unencrypted state.
 Jamming can occur at both the ground station level
or at the vessel level, and can include an attack
accomplished by jamming radio signals or a
4

denial‐of‐service attack making AIS transmission
slots unavailable.
 Message injection involves inserting spurious
messages into the vessel traffic communication
system. This is possible because AIS messages are
unencrypted and the source of the message is not
authenticated.
 Message deletion is accomplished through
destructive or constructive interference, the latter
of which is accomplished by producing a
significant number of bit errors in the message,
causing the receiving party to drop the message
due to data corruption.
 Message modification is initiated by altering a
messageʹs bit stream, generally by bit‐flipping (i.e.,
changing a 0 to a 1 or a 1 to a 0) or overshadowing
(i.e., using a high‐power transmission source to
overwrite part of, or an entire, target message).
In an effort to apply these two approaches, plus
the Parkerian Hexad described earlier, we need to
identify some specific potential information security
vulnerabilities in AIS. Combining attack descriptions
from a variety of sources (including Balduzzi et al.,
2014; Gauthier & Seker, 2018; Purton, Abbass, &
Alam, 2010; and Strohmeier, Lenders, & Martinovic,
2015), we can identify the following cyber threats to
AIS:
1 GPS signal jamming
2 GPS device failure or poor quality transmissions
3 AIS device powered down
4 AIS device malfunction
5 AIS programming error
6 AIS radio channel jamming
7 AIS radio transmission bit errors
8 AIS vessel spoofing
9 AIS traffic eavesdropping
10 AIS system flooding
11 Ghost vessel
12 Closest Point‐of‐Approach/AIS Search‐and‐Rescue
Transponder (CPA/AIS‐SART) spoofing
13 Vessel disappearance
14 Aids‐to‐Navigation (AtoN) spoofing
15 Data diddling
16 Weather forecast spoofing
Table 1 summarizes these cyber threats to AIS and
classifies them according to the Parkerian Hexad
vulnerability, and using the systems approach and
categories described above.
Table 1 suggests that while the Parkerian Hexad
provides a useful way to generally categorize the
impact of vulnerabilities, it is not useful in describing
specific threat vectors and vulnerabilities in given
cyber systems. This said, this table does seem to
suggest that there are more threats to integrity and
authenticity than to availability, which is not
surprising given the lack of integrity and
authentication checks in AIS. We also see that models
that focus only on human‐initiated attacks are not
sufficient to describe the suite of threats to
information within a given system.

Any references to GPS also applies to any GNSS.
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Table 1. AIS Cyber Risk Summary Using Descriptors from the Parkerian Hexad (Parker, 2015), Systems Approach (Gauthier
&
Seker, 2018), and Threat Category Approach (Strohmeier et al., 2015).
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Attack
Parkerian Hexad
Systems
Threat Category
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
GPS jamming
Availability
GPS/Jamming
Jamming
GPS failure/poor transmission
Availability
GPS
(nature, installation)
AIS device off
Availability
(human error)
(human error)
AIS malfunction
Availability
(nature)
(nature)
AIS bad data
Integrity, Availability, Utility
(human error)
(human error)
AIS jamming
Availability
Jamming
Jamming
AIS bit errors
Availability
(nature)
(nature)
Vessel spoofing
Integrity, Authenticity
Msg. injection
Msg. injection
Eavesdropping
Confidentiality, Authenticity
n/a
Eavesdropping
Flooding
Availability
Msg. injection
Msg. injection
Ghost vessel
Integrity, Authenticity, Utility
Msg. injection
Msg. injection
CPA/AIS‐SART spoofing
Integrity, Authenticity, Utility
Msg. injection
Msg. injection
Disappearance
Integrity, Availability
Msg. deletion
Msg. deletion
AtoN spoofing
Integrity, Authenticity, Utility
Msg. injection
Msg. injection
Data diddling
Integrity, Availability, Authenticity, Utility Msg. modification
Msg. modification
Weather
spoofing
Integrity, Authenticity, Utility
Msg. injection
Msg. injection
__________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table 1 also suggests that while the ʺsystems of
systemsʺ method is an inviting approach to
understanding the vulnerabilities in the system in
question ‐‐ here, AIS ‐‐ it does not necessarily help in
the defense of that system. In particular, an AIS
device vendor or software designer must be aware of
AIS dependencies on GPS and radio frequency (RF)
vulnerabilities but, in fact, cannot do anything to
control them. As an example, AIS will fail if someone
turns off the GPS receiver yet no AIS protections can
defend against that eventuality. Indeed, if we were to
analyze every GPS and radio transmission
vulnerability in order to understand AIS, we would
have to consider additional systemsʹ vulnerabilities as
they might impact GPS and radio. Ultimately,
someone designing AIS equipment has to be aware of
the dependency on GPS, for example, and may even
put in some mechanisms to test the integrity of the
GPS feed, but cannot protect AIS from all of the
problems that GPS might have.

6 RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
The threats identified above include intentional
attacks from human bad actors as well as errors due
to natural causes. In order to prepare appropriate risk
management plans, a proper risk assessment must be
performed. Common risk management analysis for
information systems includes accounting for natural
threats or hazards (e.g., hurricanes, floods, and
blizzards) as well as equipment failure. This all‐
hazards approach speaks to the fact that a natural
disaster is as devastating as a deliberate attack but,
from the perspective of initial response, all that
matters is the immediate impact of an event rather
than the actual attack vector.
Identifying vulnerabilities is only the first step in
building a cyber defense and understanding the true
potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Not all
vulnerabilities are equally exploitable or likely;
therefore, a risk assessment must be conducted on
each vulnerability so that one can determine how to
manage these risks. Unless clear quantitative
measures are available, a qualitative approach is
commonly employed to describe such characteristics
434

as a vulnerabilityʹs likelihood of exploit, severity
should the exploit be realized, ease of attack, and
whether it is a human‐initiated attack (including
human error) or a natural hazard (Table 2). Note that
these categorizations are relative to the AIS system
rather than the vessel itself; i.e., a vulnerability that is
critical to AIS is bad news for the ship but, by itself,
not critical to its operation.
Table
2. Risk Management Approach.
_______________________________________________
Attack
Source Likelihood Severity Ease
_______________________________________________
GPS jamming
A
4
2
3
GPS failure/poor
H
3
3
n/a
transmission
AIS device off
A
4
1
1
AIS malfunction
H
5
1
n/a
AIS bad data
A
3
3
1
AIS jamming
A
5
2
3
AIS bit errors
H
3
3
n/a
Vessel spoofing
A
4
2
2
Eavesdropping
A
1
4
1
Flooding
A
4
3
3
Ghost vessel
A
4
3
3
CPA/AIS‐SART
A
5
2
3
spoofing
Disappearance
A
4
2
3
AtoN spoofing
A
4
2
3
Data diddling
A
3
2
3
Weather
spoofing
A
4
3
3
_______________________________________________
Source: A = human‐initiated attack, H = natural hazard
Likelihood: 1 = Frequent, 2 = Probable, 3 = Occasional, 4 =
Remote, 5 = Unlikely
Severity: 1 = Catastrophic, 2 = Critical, 3 = Marginal, 4 =
Negligible
Ease of attack: 1 = Trivial, 2 = Simple, 3 = Difficult, 4 = Very
difficult

There are a number of conclusions that can be
drawn from Table 2. First, while there are more
potential intentional threats than natural hazards,
they tend to have about the same likelihood (hazards:
=3.67, =1.15; intentional threats: =3.77, =1.01).
Second, the most vulnerable attack vectors on AIS are
those where data can be inserted into the system;
many of these attacks can be realized in software‐
generated transmissions rather than by attacking the
radio frequencies themselves. Third, the most severe
attack on AIS is when the AIS receiver is off; at that
point, a vessel is driving blind with respect to AIS
information.
Fourth,
the
most
significant

vulnerabilities in AIS affect individual AIS messages
rather than the entire AIS system itself. Finally, most
of the intentional threats result directly from the fact
that AIS messages are neither encrypted nor
authenticated, coupled with the lack of integrity
checking and bit‐error correction mechanisms.
Finally, ease of attack is, in some sense, the most
difficult to quantify because the feasibility of an attack
often depends upon the adversary. An attack that is
beyond the means of a ʺpedestrianʺ hacker might be
well within the cyberattack toolkit of a nation‐state. In
any case, this table seems to suggest that none of the
identified vulnerabilities in AIS are ʺvery difficultʺ to
exploit.

research and practice for additional collision
avoidance techniques and better understanding of
traffic patterns. But if a station stores the position
at just the last transmission, it can predict a range
where the sender should be at the next
transmission. If the next announced position, or
any of the associated message parameters, vary
greatly from the prediction, that could indicate an
integrity problem. This type of capability would
require additional software, but would be
relatively simple and inexpensive to deploy, and
could be a simple add‐on to existing equipment
without requiring any change to the AIS protocol.

8 CONCLUSIONS
7 FUTURE RESEARCH
Understanding the vulnerabilities of AIS provides a
number of ideas about where to shore up the system.
There are a variety of directions that might lead to
added security in AIS; some of these ideas are
borrowed from the aviation industry. Consider:
 Some form of physical (radio transmission) layer
authentication. This methodology varies in its
difficulty, cost, and scalability, and would require
additional AIS software and/or hardware, but
would not change the AIS protocol itself
(Strohmeier et al., 2015).
 Use of Kalman filtering or other techniques to
track relative signal strength of individual ship
transmissions in order to detect possible spoofing
of that ship by an attacker. The cost and difficulty
for such an approach would be low although
scalability might be difficult. As above, no new
AIS messages would be required (Strohmeier et
al., 2015).
 Encrypted AIS (EAIS) has already been proposed
(USCG, 2014) and some variants are in limited use
for special‐purpose fleets. EAIS, however, has
limited utility for any vessel outside of the
ʺtrustedʺ group. Using some form of lightweight
public‐key
infrastructure
(PKI)
for
AIS
communication security, not terribly unlike the
use of certificates in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
already in widespread use on the Web, could
prevent certain types of attacks, such as man‐in‐
the‐middle spoofing. The downside to this
approach is the high degree‐of‐difficulty to design
and implement, and likely high cost to deploy
widely (Strohmeier et al., 2015).
 An AIS position message contains a shipʹs latitude,
longitude, course (bearing), rate and direction of
turn, and speed. The rate at which these messages
are transmitted is based upon the vesselʹs speed
and whether it is maneuvering; in any case, a ship
will change position by no more than about 230
feet (69 meters) between sequential reports. It
should be relatively simple, therefore, for a
receiver to predict the senderʹs approximate
location at the next transmission. Predictive AIS
has been described by a number of sources as a
way to use historic AIS information to predict the
path of other vessels (Hexeberg, Flåten, Eriksen, &
Brekke, 2017; Last, Bahlke, Hering‐Bertram, &
Linsen, 2014; Mazzarella, Arguedas, & Vespe,
2015), and these methods are already used for

We have all become more and more dependent upon
technology. Many younger mariners do not recall a
day at sea without radar, GPS, AIS, ECDIS, and the
other myriad data, communication, and navigation
systems aboard todayʹs large ships. Indeed, the U.S.
Navy stopped teaching celestial navigation in 1996
due to the prevalence of GPS; they brought it back 20
years later most likely due to the susceptibility of
cyber threats against GPS (Hrala, 2016). Hardware
engineers, software developers, protocol designers,
and researchers must maintain awareness of the
potential cyber threats and vulnerabilities in all
systems that they build and this security awareness
must be built‐in from the beginning of a project. The
framework and taxonomy proposed here are small
steps that demonstrate that these methods can be
employed throughout the transportation sector and,
presumably, applied to other critical infrastructures.
The model described here focuses on identifying
vulnerabilities in our systems rather than identifying
threat actors. A well‐known cybersecurity maxim
states, ʺIf you know the vulnerabilities (weaknesses),
youʹve got a shot at understanding the threats (the
probability that the weaknesses will be exploited,
how, and by whom)... But if you focus only on the
threats, youʹre likely to be in troubleʺ (Johnston, 2018,
p. 10). The object lesson is that if you concentrate on
who is trying to attack you, you will mostly likely get
it wrong because it is hard to correctly predict threats
and, in any case, as suggested above, threats are
beyond your control. Vulnerabilities, on the other
hand, are easier to identify, particularly if you think
like an attacker.
In terms of the improved situational awareness
promised by AIS, it is important to realize that while
loss of AIS decreases safety in the immediate area,
there are many other mechanisms to compensate for
its loss, such as radar, radio, increased human
lookouts, etc. AIS, then, is an important part of vessel
safety but its absence does not cause safety at sea to
fall apart. The potential devastating impact of AIS
vulnerabilities would come about if attackers
relentlessly exploited the lack of integrity and
authentication checking, and bombarded the system
with enough bogus messages so as to threaten the
very veracity of the system. Indeed, in this latter case,
AIS could be viewed as doing more harm than good,
and if only a tiny fraction of AIS messages are fake,
users will lose confidence in the entire system.
435

REFERENCES
Balduzzi, M., Wilhoit, K., & Pasta, A. (2014, December). A
Security Evaluation of AIS. Trend Micro Research Paper.
Retrieved from https://www.trendmicro.com/cloud‐
content/us/pdfs/security‐intelligence/white‐papers/wp‐
a‐security‐evaluation‐of‐ais.pdf
Barki, D., & Délèze‐Black, L. (Eds.) (2017). Review of
Maritime Transport 2017. United Nations Conference On
Trade And Development, UNCTAD/RMT/2017. New
York:
United
Nations.
Retrieved
from
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2017_en.pd
f
Boukhtouta, A., Mouheb, D., Debbabi, M., Alfandi, O.,
Iqbal, F., & El Barachi, M. (2015). Graph‐theoretic
characterization of cyber‐threat infrastructures. Digital
Investigation,
14,
S3‐S15.
Retrieved
from
https://www.dfrws.org/sites/default/files/session‐
files/paper‐graph‐theoretic_characterization_ of_cyber‐
threat_infrastructures.pdf
Czaplewski, K., & Goward, D. (2016, June). Global
Navigation Satellite Systems – Perspectives on
Development and Threats to System Operation.
TransNav, The International Journal on Marine Navigation
and Safety of Sea Transportation, 10(2), 183‐192.
https://doi.org/10.12716 /1001.10.02.01
Gauthier, R., & Seker, R. (2018, January). Addressing
Operator Privacy in Automatic Dependent Surveillance ‐
Broadcast (ADS‐B). In Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS),
Waikoloa Village, HI, USA, pp. 52‐61.
Haass, J., Craiger, J.P., & Kessler, G.C. (2018). A Framework
and Taxonomy for Aviation Cybersecurity. In
Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE National Aerospace &
Electronics Conference (NAECON) 2018, July 23‐26, 2018,
Dayton, Ohio. Los Alamitos (CA): IEEE Press.
Haass, J.C., Sampigethaya, K., & Capezzuto, V. (2016, July).
Aviation Cybersecurity: Opportunities for Applied
Research. Transportation Research Board TR News
Magazine, (304)39‐43.
Hexeberg, S., Flåten, A.L., Eriksen, B.H., & Brekke, E.F.
(2017). AIS‐Based Vessel Trajectory Prediction. In
Proceedings of the 2017 20th International Conference on
Information
Fusion
(Fusion),
Xiʹan,
pp.
1‐8.
https://doi.org/10.23919/ICIF.2017.8009762
Hrala, J. (2016, February 12). The Scary, Practical Reason
The US Navy Is Once Again Teaching Celestial
Navigation. Science Alert Web site. Retrieved from
https://www.sciencealert.com/the‐scary‐practical‐
reason‐the‐navy‐is‐once‐again‐teaching‐celestial‐
navigation
International Maritime Organization (IMO). (2002, July 1).
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), Chapter V (Safety of Navigation), Regulation
19 (Carriage requirements for shipborne navigational
systems
and
equipment).
Retrieved
from
https://mcanet.mcga.gov.uk /public/c4/solas/index.html
International Maritime Organization (IMO). (2018).
Maritime Security ‐ AIS Ship Data. AIS Transponders
Web
page.
Retrieved
from
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pa
ges/AIS.aspx
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2014,
February). Technical Characteristics for an Automatic
Identification System Using Time Division Multiple Access
in the VHF Maritime Mobile Frequency Band. M‐Series:
Mobile, radiodetermination, Amateur and Related
Satellite Services. ITU‐R Recommendation M.1371‐5.
Retrieved from https://www.itu.int/dms_pubrec/itu‐
r/rec/m/R‐REC‐M.1371‐5‐201402‐I!!PDF‐E.pdf
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2015,
March). Assignment and Use of Identities in the Maritime
Mobile Service. M‐Series: Mobile, radiodetermination,
Amateur and Related Satellite Services. ITU‐R
Recommendation
M.585‐7.
Retrieved
from

436

https://www.itu.int
/dms_pubrec/itu‐r/rec/m/R‐REC‐
M.585‐7‐201503‐I!!PDF‐E.pdf
Johnston, R.G. (2018, August). Vulnerabilities Trump
Threats Maxim. Security Maxims. Right Brain Sekurity.
Retrieved from http://rbsekurity.com/Papers/security
maxims with axe.pdf
Kessler, G.C. (2018, August 11). An Overview of
Cryptography.
Retrieved
from
https://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html
Kessler, G.C. (In press, expected 2019, Spring).
Cybersecurity in the Maritime Domain. Proceedings of the
USCG Marine Safety & Security Council.
Last, P., Bahlke, C., Hering‐Bertram, M., & Linsen, L. (2014,
September). Comprehensive Analysis of Automatic
Identification System (AIS) Data in Regard to Vessel
Movement Prediction. The Journal of Navigation, 67(5),
791‐809. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0373463314000253
Mansouri, M., Gorod, A., Wakeman, T.H., & Sauser, B.
(2009). A Systems Approach to Governance in Maritime
Transportation System of Systems. Proceedings of the
IEEE International Conference on System of Systems
Engineering (SoSE). Albuquerque, NM.
MarEx. (2018, April 3). Kongsberg and Wilhelmsen Launch
Autonomous‐Shipping JV. The Maritime Executive.
Retrieved
from
https://www.maritime‐
executive.com/article/kongsberg‐and‐wilhelmsen‐
launch‐autonomous‐shipping‐jv
Mazzarella, F., Arguedas, V.F., & Vespe, M. (2015).
Knowledge‐Based Vessel Position Prediction Using
Historical AIS Data. In Proceedings of 2015 Sensor Data
Fusion: Trends, Solutions, Applications (SDF), Bonn, 2015,
pp. 1‐6. https://doi.org/10.1109/SDF.2015.7347707
Parker, D.B. (2015). Toward a New Framework for
Information Security? In S. Bosworth, M.E. Kabay, & E.
Whyne (Eds.), Computer Security Handbook, 6th ed. (pp
3.1‐3.23). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Purton, L., Abbass, H., & Alam, S. (2010). Identification of
ADS‐B System Vulnerabilities and Threats. In
Proceedings of the Australasian Transport Research Forum
2010, 29 September ‐ 1 October 2010, Canberra,
Australia.
Raymond, E.S. (2016, August). AIVDM/AIVDO Protocol
Decoding.
Version
1.52.
Retrieved
from
http://catb.org/gpsd/AIVDM.html
Ridden, P. (2018, September 4). Unmanned Surface Vessel
Successfully Crosses Atlantic. New Atlas Web site.
Retrieved from https://newatlas.com/offshore‐sensing‐
sailbuoy‐met‐atlantic/56204/
Roberts, F.S. (2015, January). Vulnerabilities of Cyber‐
Physical Systems: From Football to Oil Rigs. Retrieved
from
http://www.dimacs.rutgers.edu/People/Staff/
froberts/CyberPhysicalSystemsFootballOilRigs1‐3‐
15.pptx.pdf
Serpanos, D. (2018, March). The Cyber‐Physical Systems
Revolution. Computer, 51(3), 70‐73.
Shine Micro. (n.d.). AIS Overview. Retrieved from
https://www.shinemicro.com/ais‐overview/
Strohmeier, M., Lenders, V., & Martinovic, I. (2015). On the
Security of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance‐
Broadcast Protocol. IEEE Communications Surveys &
Tutorials, 17(2), 1066‐1087.
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). (2014, June 4). Encrypted
Automatic Identification System (EAIS) Interface Design
Description
(IDD).
Command,
Control,
and
Communications Engineering Center (C3Cen).Retrieved
from https://epic.org/foia/dhs/uscg/nais/EPIC‐15‐05‐29‐
USCG‐FOIA‐20151030‐Production‐2.pdf
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). (2018, July 24). AIS
Requirements. USCG Navigation Center Web site.
Retrieved
from
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISRequire
mentsRev
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). (n.d.). Marine
Transportation System (MTS). Maritime Administration
(MARAD)
Web
site.
Retrieved
from

https://www.marad.dot.gov/ports/marine‐
transportation‐system‐mts/
Wikipedia. (2018, July 17). Automatic Identification System.
Retrieved
from
https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Automatic_identification_system
World Shipping Council. (n.d.). Trade Statistics. Retrieved
from
http://www.worldshipping.org/about‐the‐
industry/global‐trade/trade‐statistics

437

